UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS IN SHACKLE'S THEORY OF CAPITAL AND INTEREST*
1. Introduction. Theory (1967) , the contribution to the economics that largely failed to materialize in the second half is provided in his subsequent book Epistemics and Economics (1972) . These books may be regarded as a summa of Shackle's work on uncertainty and expectations ever since he started his studies in the 1930's 1 .
The stream of theory discussed by Shackle was launched in the 1920's by Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) and Keynes's A Treatise on Probability (1921) and was extended in the 1930's to the rising branch of macroeconomics and to "period analysis" as a crucial component of this branch. This extension was implemented by Myrdal's Monetary Equilibrium (1939) and, through the controversies raised by Hayek's Prices and Production (1931) and subsequent publications, by Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) and by Hicks's Value and Capital (1939, Part III and Part IV) .
The scope of this paper is to focus on the macroeconomic extension of this stream. The focus will be placed, within this extension, on the new view of time and the resulting theory of * I wish to thank G. C. Harcourt, the participants to the 3 rd STOREP European Summer School in Brixen for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
capital and interest that was developed in those years. The paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 focuses on Shackle's account of the conflict between the new theories of the "Age of Turmoil" (the 1930's) and the old theories of the "Age of Tranquillity". In this section it will be argued that the conflict runs between two sets of theories so different from each other that they can be regarded as two Paradigms: the General Equilibrium Theories (GET Paradigm) and the Economics of Uncertainty and Expectations (EUE Paradigm). The replacement of the old Paradigm, it will be argued, amounts to the replacement of the general framework of "logical" (or no) time by the new framework of "historical" time. After
Marshall, who was not unaware of the importance of this framework, it was Keynes who brought that replacement to completion. Section 4 deals with the replacement of the theory of interest, as developed in the Age of Tranquillity, by the theory of the money rate of interest, as developed in the new age. This section shows how this replacement goes hand-in-hand with a sophisticated development of the notion of money as a store of value (a crucial idea of the EUE Paradigm) and of the roles assigned to uncertainty and expectations in determining the equilibrium money rate of interest and its changes from period to period.
Section 5 is an attempt to link the new theory of interest (more properly: of the money rate of interest) to the Austrian theory of capital as re-deployed by Shackle. Here it is argued that Shackle's re-deployment suffers from the same general limits of his own theory of interest (or account of it) as shown in Section 4, i.e. from his overemphasizing the neglect of historical time in the Austrian theory; a neglect that it was up to Hayek (as acknowledged by Shackle) to overcome.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks on the strengths and weaknesses of Shackle's contribution to economics and the history of economic theory. It is argued that the strengths overwhelm the weaknesses and that current macroeconomics has failed to take advantage of these strengths.
The conflict of Paradigms: GET vs. EUE
Isaiah Berlin's dictum that "the fox knows many things, the hedgehog knows one big thing" is used by Shackle (1967, p.135) to identify the structure of Keynes's "long struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression". According to Shackle, the "many things" of this escape are the particular notions and arguments (such as the postulates of classical economics or the three fundamental psychological factors of Keynes's General Theory) that Keynes aimed respectively to eliminate from, or to introduce into, our "habitual modes of thought". By contrast, Keynes's "one big thing" is the acknowledgment of men's inescapable ignorance of the future and its impact on the "nature of decision in general and therefore of the decision to invest" (1967, pp.135-6) What Shackle here calls "decision in general" and "decision to invest" can be investigated at the level either of an individual agent or, if one looks at the interaction between the decisions of all agents taken together, of the economy as a whole. Shackle pursued both lines of research (in his 1969 and 1979 books, for instance, he is concerned with the former line whereas in his 1967 and 1972 books he is concerned with the latter). In both cases, however, the decisionmaking that is investigated is decision-making in time 2 . However often the term time is used in Shackle's work, it is never specified whether this is historical or logical time in J. Robinson's sense (1962 Robinson's sense ( , 1974 3 . Yet the time that lies at the roots of Shackle's thought is unquestionably 2 The expression "in time" is here used in the sense of Hicks when he writes that "Menger's theory is an economics in time but Bohm's is an economics of time" (time being, in the latter case, "no more than a mathematical parameter" (1976, p.139) . It is interesting to note that Hicks regards Menger's own theory of liquidity as a clear indication of a theory in time (see below note 7) and therefore as a forerunner of Keynes's "marginal efficiency of capital" and "liquidity preference". These notions are indeed in time although, as Hicks argues in Shackle's (unrecognized) footsteps (see below §3, bottom), "Keynes's theory has one leg which is in time, but another which is not" (ibid., pp.139-40) . Given Shackle's two lines of research indicated above, Hicks's insight may be extended to Shackle by arguing that both legs of Shackle's theory are in time. On Shackle's first line of research, see Lachmann (1990) . 3 Shackle does indeed distinguish between "time of mechanism" -or mechanical time-and "time of uncertainty" -or expectational time-(to which he adds Marshallian evolutionary time) and ranks economic theories in terms of whether these are based on one or another of these notions (1965, Chapter VII; see also 1967) . His "mechanical time" is much the same as J. Robinson's "logical time" while his "expectational time" corresponds to the latter's "historical time". Since J. Robinson's distinction has gained ground in economic literature (see, for instance, Vickers, 1994) while the term time is often used by Shackle without any adjectives, in this paper we will adopt J.Robinson's wording. The scope of J.Robinson's distinction has been summarized by Harris (2005) in the following terms (the "substitutability" and "specificity" mentioned in row 5 may be better rendered by the terms "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity"):
Logical The contrast between the two Paradigms starts with Shackle's argument that economics presents itself, according to the GET Paradigm, as the science of scarcity whereas it presents itself, according to the EUE Paradigm, as the science of uncertainty (1967, p.7 and p.146 ).
This argument proceeds as follows:
"Economic theory has asked two questions: How will things happen? What will things be like?
The former leads to a study of diachronic forms, of a series of situations growing in some sense one out of another and thus composing a unity spread along the calendar. The latter leads to the construction of an exact, encompassing, timeless adjustment. Our purpose is now to consider this contrast of method and of the insight which the two methods seek. Both methods, in the nature of things, must study what is at some (one or more) moment. For existence is existence at a moment, the moment of existence is solitary and by itself. In the diachronic method, however, what exists is assumed to have, as a whole, such a character that it must transform itself into something different in the next moment. In the synchronic method, transformations have merely a potential existence as a background to throw into relief the adjustment which has been attained" (1972, p.89 ).
The two questions above can be assimilated to the questions 1) as to how water runs from a hill into a lake (how will things happen?) and 2) as to how the same water disposes itself into the lake (what will things be like?). The static method is as necessary for answering the latter question as it is in closing the GET Paradigm with the notion of (partial or general) equilibrium:
"Rational conduct is that which is demonstrably the most advantageous open to the individual in view of his circumstances. In order to demonstrate its superiority, even if he can do so only to himself, he must know what those circumstances are. Knowable circumstances can be those only of an immediate present. Situations and events removed into the future are not observable, and thus not knowable, for there is no proof of any rigid implication of the future by the past, and such an implication would contradict the notion of originative choice. Rational conduct is thus confined to a timeless or a momentary world. The circumstance which will affect the outcome of given conduct include the actions of other individuals. In order that each person may choose his conduct in effective knowledge of the contemporaneous choices of others, there must be pre-reconciliation of all choices by means of a declaration and pooling of conditional intentions" (1972, p.53) 6 .
Since, however, knowledge changes "as soon as we permit time to elapse" (Lachmann, 1959, quoted by Shackle, 1972, title-page) , it follows that the introduction of historical time implies the abandonment of the assumption of perfect knowledge of other people's -and even of our own-"conditional intentions". Hence the dissolution of the GET Paradigm and the rise of the EUE Paradigm. Hence the emphasis of the EUE Paradigm on uncertainty and expectations as well as its reliance on period and process analysis 7 .
Once uncertainty and expectations are introduced into the picture, money itself must be accommodated in a new guise. Prior to the years of high theory, money was usually regarded in economic analysis in its familiar aspects of unit of account (numéraire) and means of payment. Indeed, when economic theory was concerned in the classical period with the fundamental question of the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (the "Classical Paradigm") or, over one century later, with the very different question of general equilibrium (the GET Paradigm), money could well be regarded as "a sort of mechanical device running at its own speed" (1972, p.12) . But when the focus shifted to the EUE Paradigm (in which time is permitted to elapse and knowledge to change), money came to be regarded in its additional aspect of a store of value and, therefore, as a further link between uncertainty and economic behaviour (both at the individual and at the aggregate level) 8 :
"Money, as something which can introduce a time interval between selling one thing and deciding what to have in exchange for it, can evidently have no place in a system whose logic requires all its choices to be comprehensively simultaneous in order that they may be prereconciled and thus fully informed. Money is the means of stopping half-way in the complete transaction of exchange, the means of avoiding or postponing the hazardous and expectational choice of a concrete, specialized asset whose value is a conjecture about the relation of its design to future technology and markets. Liquidity is a denial of the rationality of the only economic world we have evolved" (1972, p.164) 9 .
Hence the question that lies at the roots of Keynes's rejection of Say's Law: in a system without money or, to be more precise, in a system where money is considered only as "a device running at its own speed", does not Say's Law hold true? Shackle's answer runs as follows:
"The answer which seems to me to impose itself is that money ["in its full nature", 1967, p.93 and below §3] absolves those who seek to accumulate wealth out of current production from necessarily themselves deciding what real form this wealth should take, placing the burden of this decision, and its consequences, on a few business men. It thus greatly multiplies, and offers extensive leverage to, the basic fact of ignorance of the future, and enables what might, in a barter system, be a large number of mostly unimportant discrepancies between the supply and demand of individual goods and the exertions and reward of individual persons to become a unified, measurable and very large gulf between what has been deemed worth producing in hope, and what, when market day comes at the end of a long period of speculative commitment of resources, actually proves to be exchangeable for money. Money enormously enlarges the hurtful power of uncertainty at the same time as it enormously facilitates the beneficent power of specialization" (1967, p.136-7) 10 .
Ex ante vs. ex post
The fact that individuals may hold at the same moment divergent or even opposite expectations of some future event should be distinguished from the fact that the expectations held by all the individuals who take similar decisions at the same moment (aggregate expectations) may be contradicted by the events that will emerge in the course of (historical) time after this moment is past. While the former fact mostly relates to the future behaviour of prices of particular goods or assets, the latter fact rather refers to the behaviour of macroeconomic flows such as output, consumption, saving and investment in the forthcoming period. Hence the importance of expectations for period analysis and the associated concept of macroeconomic equilibrium (which is an equilibrium in time). Hence the introduction of two new notions, i.e. first, the notion of the amounts that, at the threshold of the period, are intended (by entrepreneurs and income-receivers) to be formed during the period; and second, the notion of the amounts that, at the final date of the period, have been formed during the same period. Myrdal (1939) highlighted this difference by introducing the terms ex ante for the macro-variables considered in the first sense and ex post for the (same) macro-variables 10 The validity and limits of Say's Law are also defended as follows: "Inequality of total demand and total supply, to be logically possible, requires the presence and the play of both ignorance and money. Ignorance, in the real world, there is indeed: ignorance of the future. And money is that institution which permits deferment of specialized, fully detailed choice" (1967, p.91) . Hence the possibility of speculation as the "exploitation of ignorance" and the rationale of the interest rate as the price paid for compensating the uncertainty associated with lending money, i.e. for "parting with a known sum in exchange for an unknown sum" of money (1972, pp.12-3) . See, however, below §5. considered in the second sense. Shackle (1965, Chapter IV; 1967, Chapters 9-10; 1972, Chapter 37) most ably shows not only why this distinction is necessary in period analysis but also how it can be used to identify some flaws, and to fill some voids, in Keynes's theory.
Shackle's account of the former aspect is also an attempt to justify the title of Myrdal's 1939 book:
"In a model where money in its full nature (not merely in its role of unit of account) plays an essential role, the equality of total demand and total supply is a condition or special circumstance which is logically capable of non-fulfilment. The monetary theory which Wicksell evolved from suggestions of Ricardo, and which Lindahl clarified and to which Myrdal gave the vital spark by his distinction of the two temporal viewpoints ex ante and ex post, and to which he gave a brilliant elegance and logical rigour, was devised with the very purpose of analysing the conditions of equality of total monetary demand and supply of the general output of goods of all sorts. It has also, of course, the purpose of studying the implications of non-fulfilment of these conditions" (1967, p.93).
The fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these conditions are most likely to occur when it comes to the crucial relation between aggregate saving and aggregate investment. The link between this relation and the relation between aggregate demand and aggregate supply consists, to begin with, in the fact that both relations can be viewed either as accounting identities or as equilibrium conditions according to the following six relations (of which four are identities and two are equilibrium conditions) (1967, p.95):
(i) Expected income is identically equal to value of intended production.
(ii) Expected income is identically equal to intended consumption-spending plus intended saving.
(iii) Value of intended production is identically equal to intended consumption-spending plus intended saving.
(iv) Intended demand is identically equal to intended consumption-spending plus intended net investment.
(v) Intended demand can be equal to value of intended production.
(vi) Intended net investment can be equal to intended saving.
Taken together, these relations indicate that intended demand (iv) may not be equal to value of intended production (iii) because intended net investment (vi) may not be equal to intended saving (vi), it being understood that any such inequality is usually brought about not by changes in intended saving but by the changes in intended net investment. These changes will result from shifts in the expectations concerning the "yield of planned investments" (in Myrdal's terms), the "marginal efficiency of capital" (in Keynes's terms) or the "rate of return over cost" (in Fisher's terms) 11 . When (vi) does not involve equality, the economy faces a macroeconomic disequilibrium: this outcome is as inescapable in an economy in time as much as its opposite is inescapable in the abstract economy of GET.
Shackle's discussion of the ex ante/ex post distinction, however, is extended to show that some of the "many things" to be found in Keynes's thought are muddled by his failures to make use of this distinction. At the core of these failures is, according to this view, Keynes's inability to use the concept of income as a forward-looking variable rather than, as implied by
Keynes and many Keynesians, as the more familiar backward-looking notion concerning what has been earned in a given period. Hence Keynes's vacillations between a process conception of the Multiplier -involving expectation and decisions-and the instantaneous conception by which consumption depends on realized income (in which case, Shackle argues, the mechanism would not work) rather than on expected income (in which case, Shackle argues,
an increase in expected consumption should rather be understood as an increase in orders for supplies). Keynes's neglect of the ex ante/ex post distinction, however, is particularly dangerous when he comes to the relation between aggregate saving and aggregate investment.
Here his vacillations serve to conceal, rather than to highlight, the reason for their possible discrepancies. Thus, referring to chapter 7 of the General Theory where saving and investment are claimed to be necessarily and identically equal, Shackle argues:
"The reader of that chapter will perceive that its reasoning refers to ex post quantities, and taking it by itself we therefore find it perfectly acceptable. But it leaves Keynes's general position quite ambiguous. Does he believe that by proving this identity he is saying something about a coherence of intentions or wishes?
If not, what is the mechanism by which a possible (and exceedingly likely) disagreement between total intended saving and total intended investment is corrected into an ex post equality?" (1967, p.148) .
Following Hawtrey's insight on Keynes's ambiguity on this issue 12 , Shackle argues that "it is the level of incomes which moves in search of an equilibrium between (designed, ex ante) saving and (designed, ex ante) investment" and that "when there is a disparity, a disequilibrium, between the two ex ante quantities, there will almost inevitably follow one period later, that is, so soon as this disparity is revealed ex post, a set of decisions by business men to change designed general output, and thus aggregate income" until the designed saving and investment of the next period are brought, if ever, to equality" (1967, pp.242-3). Thus 11 "The fulfilment of this condition is that state of intentions which constitutes monetary equilibrium, and this equilibrium, which might be more illuminatingly called equilibrium of general output and general demand, is nonetheless justifiably linked with the notion of money because only the presence of money in the full sense makes possible any divorce, in the aggregate, between production intentions and demand intentions" (ibid., p.95-6).
12 "If saving and investment are defined as 'different aspects of the same thing' how can it possibly be 'the level of income which ensures equality between saving and investment'?" (Hawtrey, 1937, p.437 ).
Keynes's ambiguity is said to descend from his tendency to telescope the moment of decisions and the moment of confrontation of the acts implied by decisions (i.e. the two ends of the Myrdallian interval, the ex ante and the ex post):
"His constant reiteration that investment and saving cannot be unequal, but are brought to equality by changes of income, means that he defines income, not as the value-added which the business men imagine and look to when they sign contracts of factor employment relating to the coming interval, but as the value-added which they would assign to their production plans were they able, in some Wellsian time-machine, to move forward to the end of that interval and see what quantities, at what prices, will actually be sold, and then move back again to its beginning to note that when correct valuations are placed upon their production plans, saving and investment are equal" (1967, p.238 ).
This insight implies that Keynes's period analysis lacks a suitable equilibrium mechanism for supporting his equilibrium method 13 .
Theory of interest vs. theory of (money) interest rate(s)
The crucial role assigned to money as a store of value in the EUE Paradigm could not be without consequences for the theory of interest. Shackle's views on interest are pursued at
length both in the Years of High Theory and in Epistemics and Economics. They stem from
Keynes's view of interest as the "reward of not-hoarding" rather than as the "reward of notspending" (1936, ch.13) and must be regarded as an application of the more general theory of uncertainty and expectations. As is well known, Keynes's view of interest is put forward in his liquidity-preference theory (1936, Chapters 13-17) . This theory must be distinguished from what may be called, following the title of Cassel's celebrated book, the nature-and-necessity theory of interest, the founding father of which is, as is also well known, Böhm-Bawerk.
Keynes's and Böhm-Bawerk's theories of interest fall apart in two senses. First, because the object of Böhm-Bawerk's theory is the nature of interest sub specie aeternitatis, i.e. regardless 13 The importance of the ex ante/ex post distinction is missed in most macroeconomic textbooks and literature. Blanchard (2000) , for instance, underrates the role of this distinction and emphasizes Keynes's "methodological contributions" to such an extent that he claims (contra, but without mentioning, Shackle's interpretations) that "throughout the 1920's and 1930's the focus was increasingly on the role of the equality of saving and investment, but the semantic squabbles that dominated much of the debate (the distinction between 'ex ante' and 'ex post', 'planned' and 'realised' saving and investment, the discussion of whether the equality of saving and investment was an identity or an equilibrium condition) reflected a deeper confusion. It was just not clear how shifts in saving and investment affected output" (pp.1378-9, where it is pointed out that this was made clear only in the General Theory). The implicit treatment or mistreatment and the eventual rejection of the ex ante/ex post distinction in Keynes's theory deserves a proper study. For a starting point, see Kregel (1976) and Shackle himself (1965, Chapter IV; 1967, Chapters 9-10; 1972, Chapters 16 17, and pp.439-42) . See also above footnote 7 and below footnote 17. For the argument that Keynes's ambiguity on this issue was a matter of method rather than of words, see Shackle again (1967, pp.142-3; 1965, Chapter IV) . On the links between desidered/undesired stocks, flexprice/fixprice models and stock/flow equilibrium, see in this connection Hicks (1974, Section II) . The relevance of the ex ante/ex post distinction in modern macroeconomics is implied by the difference between the analytical concept of period and the historical concept of run highlighted by Harcourt (2006, p.62, n.6 This rate brings about the equilibration of two flows and two stocks; i.e. the flows of net lending (the underwriting of bonds) and of net borrowing (the issuing of the same bonds), on the one hand, and the stocks of the bonds existing at a particular moment and of the bonds wanted by potential holders at this very moment, on the other. Thus the "enigma and dilemma" of interest-rate theory consists in determining how this twofold equilibration is reached.
Indeed, while the flow mechanism calls for actual transactions between issuers and underwriters of bonds, the stock mechanism need not: here a change in expectations is enough to force the prices of existing bonds up or down and, accordingly, the interest rate down or up.
Since, however, the quantity of old bonds in existence is in a modern economy overwhelmingly greater than the quantity of annual bond issues, uncertainty and expectations are more relevant in determining today's interest-rate than any change in the relative strength of today's lending (saving) and borrowing (investment). Finally, the link between changes in the stock equilibrium of the bond market and changes in the level of employment is brought out by Shackle as follows:
"Suppose that the 'stock' mechanism, being dominant, has carried the rate of interest above the level which would have resulted from the 'flow' mechanism operating alone, and that at this high level the society's desired saving flow exceeds its desired net investment flow. Since, ex post, these flows must by logical necessity be equal, we have to explain how it comes about that one or other or both of the realized flows differs from its corresponding intended flow. The first result of disparity may be that some goods, intended for immediate sale to consumers, will be left with their producers and constitute unintended investment. Later it seems likely, or inevitable, that production as a whole will be reduced. Out of the smaller income which measures this lower production, the society will desire to save less than it had formerly hoped to out of its former relatively large income. Too high an interest rate will have caused unemployment and a reduced general output, If the 'flow' mechanism is prevented (by the dominant 'stock' mechanism) from performing its task at a high level of general output and aggregate incomes it will compel the reduction of that output and income to a level where it can perform its task. Keynes's theory of employment requires the supposition that the 'stock' mechanism is, or at least can be, dominant" (1967, p.208) .
indication of Keynes's ambiguities and an implicit clue to the accusation that he eventually had "a college bursar's theory of interest", see his remarks on Marshall as someone whom he regards as responsible for what we can in turn regard as a reciprocal misunderstanding: "The perplexity which I find in Marshall's account of the matter is fundamentally due, I think, to the incursion of the concept 'interest', which belongs to a monetary economy, into a treatise which takes no account of money. 'Interest' has really no business to turn up at all in Marshall's Principles of Economics -it belongs to another branch of the subject" (1936, p.189; italics added).
This passage shows that the notion of money as a store of value, if properly combined with the notions of stock equilibrium in the bond market and of flow equilibrium in the saving-andinvestment markets, paves the way for connecting Keynes Concerning Hayek, it should be noted that the problem of what determines, in a monetary economy, the price of "something to keep" versus the price of "something to sell, buy and use now or never" (Shackle, 1965, p.91) bears some resemblance to the problem (as set out, for instance, in Prices and Production) of what determines, in a real economy, the amounts and shapes of the capital goods existing at an instant of time (a stock equilibrium or disequilibrium in real terms) versus the amounts and shapes of the capital goods that are produced in a period of time (a flow equilibrium or disequilibrium in the same terms). And it should equally be added that the ex ante/ex post distinction may be used to address both problems though the role it plays in addressing the latter is more significant than in the former. Any discrepancy between ex ante saving and investment, for instance, may result in a change in the price of securities (and therefore in the money rate of interest) if it is related to the former problem. But it may also result in a change in the shapes of the capital goods produced (and more generally in the structure of production) if it is related to the latter. In the passage above, Shackle's argument is focused on the former rather than on the latter problem. This is a strictly Keynesian argument and should be distinguished from Hayek's structure-of-production argument which is focused instead on (inappropriate) changes in the production of capital goods resulting from an increase in the stock of money (forced saving) rather than from an increase in aggregate demand resulting from an initial change in aggregate investment (whether due to a shift in the marginal efficiency of capital or in the money rate of interest) 19 . deal with the theory of money rates of interest, chapter XI being wrongly titled -à la Shackle-"Interest" rather than -as would be more appropriate-"The Term Structure of Interest Rates").
Concerning

Capital and Time
A place where Shackle comes closest to the notions of logical and historical time is when he deals with the "paradoxical contrast" between the timeless system and the long period conception (both of which "treat time with disdain" although the former excludes it altogether through the pre-reconciliation of choices while the latter introduces it into the picture but only 19 On the impact of discrepancies between (voluntary) saving and investment on the shapes of capital goods, see Lachmann's treatment of changes in his "capital structure" resulting from changes in expectations (1978) . It should also be noted that, when he comes to an explicit treatment of (time in) the theory of capital (more on this below in section 5), Shackle shifts his focus from the Keynesian (financial-market) approach to the money rate of interest towards a remake of Bohm-Bawerk's old and static theory of capital (not, in any case, towards a remake of the latter's theory of interest as such) rather than of Hayek's dynamic version of the old theory. See, however, Shackle's own and brief treatment of the composition and direction of what he calls the "capital complex" (another expression for Lachmann's capital structure) in his 1972 book, Chapter 29, §29.2 and §29.11. 20 It is interesting to note that Hicks himself came up to this task later when he admitted that his 1939 book had built "a kind of a bridge, but, as I now see very well, it was a very imperfect bridge, not so very unlike the imperfect bridge that had been built by Keynes. My theory also was divided; there was a part that was in time and a part that was not. But we did not divide in the same place" (1976, p.141 that the theory of capital built on this notion "goes to the heart of things" whereas Böhm-Bawerk's theory is based on the assumption of the stationary state where knowledge and 21 On this ambiguity, see Shackle's notions of "time as room for something", "time inseparable from tool using"
and "time as the field of expectation", in Shackle, 1972, pp.284-5, pp.268-9 and p.266 . On Shackle's account of how Marshall faced this ambiguity, see ibid., p.289ff.
22 "For when the goods dealt in on the markets are perishable and ephemeral, they must be changed at once and therefore find a price at once, and there will be no considerations bearing on that price except the immediate needs, tastes and momentary endowments of the members of a society. Prices in such a society must be formed; they can be formed because they are properly based on definite and simple data. It is the introduction of 'wealth', of assets which promise and represent permanence or persistence, that must destroy the basis of rationality" (1967, p.157) . On the role of (short-term) expectations in "processes which occupy time", see Keynes (1936, p.46). foresight are assumed to be perfect, events can be "both sequential and co-existent" and processes of change are excluded (ibid. pp-316-7; 329-331 ).
Yet it remains to be seen whether the theory that "goes to the heart of things" should be the "the element of time is the centre of the chief difficulty of almost every economic problem" as well as the vain boldness of Marshall's "relentless effort to bring into one fabric of argument the two incompatibles" (i.e. the different problems relating to logical and historical time) (Shackle, 1972, p.286 ).
It should be recalled, however, that the Austrian theory comes in two instalments and that the second instalment, which was designed to overcome the limits of the first, is due mostly to Mises and Hayek. Hayek, in particular, was the one who took the static core of the theory of capital out of the stationary state and placed it into the context of historical time (to which fluctuations belong). Hence the coalescence of the (Austrian) theory of capital into "the great macro-economic river" where it "became enmeshed with the theory of money" and contributed to forming the new theory of business cycles (Shackle,1981 (Shackle, 1983 , p.108) (but it was implied above that the former's 'sealed orders' are stronger than the latter's). Another was the rise of "hydraulic" or "bastard Keynesianism"
and the "Keynesian" policies pursued by most governments in its wake. Still another was the direction taken by the theory of expectations in the last decades of the 20 th century with its emphasis on rationality and equilibrium even in economies immersed in historical time.
Finally, and perhaps more important than anything else, was the rise in the second half of the 20 th century of an approach by which the GET Paradigm -either in its old or in its newly forged versions-came to be regarded as "a kind of umbrella general enough as to be able to cover all economic theories, including also Keynes's" (Pasinetti, 2005, p.211, n.3 ). This tendency, it must be noted, should in turn be distinguished from, and -due to its own misunderstandings of the different scopes of different paradigms-should rather be regarded as worse than, the idea of an "absolute" replacement of the GET by the EUE Paradigm occasionally implied (and occasionally denied) in Shackle's works. 23 Though entirely devoted to Hayek's contributions, Shackle's 1981 article fails to bring out the continuity lying behind their convoluted developments between the 1928 article on intertemporal equilibrium (which can be regarded as a situation where expectations are always fulfilled) and the publications of the following decade (which deal instead with situations in which this fulfilment does not occur). This continuity is implicitly defended in The Pure Theory of Capital (where, for instance, it is argued that "the statement of the conditions under which individual plans will be compatible is implicitly a statement of what will happen if they are not compatible", p.23) and has been recognized by Graziani (1996) . It should finally be noted that in his 1981 article, Shackle also fails to bring out the common interest shared by both Hayek and Keynes, his two conflicting mentors, for the role of expectations. On expectations as an "opportunity" missed by the Austrians, see however Lachmann (1976) .
Not that Shackle's thought is without contradictions. We have warned above against some of the arguments, and especially some of the words, by which Shackle's view of the history of economic theory in the 20 th century is put forward. We have first highlighted his ambiguous treatment of the replacement of the GET Paradigm by the EUE Paradigm and we have rejected his view of Keynes's theory of the money rate of interest as an "absolute" substitute for Böhm-Bawerk's theory of interest. But the sharpness and elegance by which Shackle goes to the heart of the EUE Paradigm and of Keynes's "monetary theory of production" are such as to provide the reader with the key for grasping on his/her own not only the huge differences but also the distant compatibilities between the two Paradigms. Both these differences and compatibilities descend, it was argued above, from the two different foundations -logical (or no) time in one case, historical time in the other-on which the two Paradigms stand.
